Conference Description
A common story told about academic philosophy in the 20th and 21st centuries is that is divided into two opposed camps, usually called ‘analytic’ and ‘continental’ philosophy. This conference proposes to assess a third, and often overlooked, philosophical tradition, ‘pragmatism’, in the light of this division. In pragmatism, we hope to discover novel approaches to the issues that divide the analytic and continental traditions.
Typically, analytic and continental philosophies are differentiated according to origins, methodologies, styles, and concerns. Analytic philosophy emerged in the early 20th century with British thinkers such as Bertrand Russell and G. E. Moore. It was presented as a split from a broader philosophical tradition which included Kant and Hegel, and was labelled 'continental' with the inclusion of figures such as Husserl, Kierkegaard, and Heidegger.
Analytic philosophy is defined, according to Dummett, by the view that the goal of philosophy is 'the analysis of the structure of thought', and that 'the only proper method of analysing thought consists in the analysis of language'. The preferred methodology for this project is the systematic, precise, and technical analysis of language and concepts, often with an appeal to formal logic. Stylistically, analytic philosophy prefers technical and clear prose, which deal with small, highly specific areas. This suits the primary concerns of analytic philosophy, which are the often seen to be questions of logic, metaphysics, and epistemology, treated rigorously and removed from the concerns of everyday life. Philosophy tends to be seen as a science, dealing like other sciences with narrow questions and specific research projects. The relation between philosophy and the sciences, and the role of the sciences within philosophy, is an important concern for analytic philosophy.
Continental philosophy is more difficult to categorise, as it is a term created by analytic philosophers in order to classify all European philosophy which was not analytic. It contains many diverse traditions, such as phenomenology, existentialism, idealism, critical theory and postmodernism. A broader array of methodologies can be found in continental philosophy, from phenomenological analysis, to genealogical analysis, and critical engagement with cultural practices. Correspondingly, the styles which can be found in continental philosophy are often less clear than the rigorous analytic standards allow for. They tend to be more evocative, literary, and even performative than analytic philosophy, in part because continental philosophy's central areas of concern are not always best dealt with using scientific precision. Topics and goals in continental philosophy range from metaphysics and epistemology, to questions concerning the nature of human existence, and philosophical criticisms of contemporary culture. Continental philosophy is also concerned with its relation to science, but this is often (though not always) accompanied by a suspicion of scientific hegemony and an appeal to literature and art instead.
This story, and the corresponding divide, has come under increasing pressure in recent years. Some analytic philosophers have rediscovered the importance of Kant and Hegel, as well as other non-analytic thinkers. The subjects which analytic philosophy considers relevant or philosophically considerable has also been broadened. Conversations between the traditions have opened up, in part due to increased engagement with figures who transcend the divide (such as Wittgenstein). Nonetheless, there are still questions concerning the methodology, style, subject matter, and goals of philosophy on which typically analytic and continental philosophers disagree, as well as issues concerning philosophy's role in wider society, and its relation with other disciplines and sciences.
American Pragmatism is a philosophical tradition which emerged outside of Europe, and predates the division between analytic and continental philosophy. As such, it has elements which both sides can recognise. Charles Sanders Peirce pioneered quantification logic, a favourite of analytic philosophy, but also semiotic analysis, a favourite of the continentals. William James was concerned to bring the method of science to bear on philosophy, but did so in order to defend a phenomenological and humanistic approach which foregrounded the human importance of traditional philosophical concerns. Both thinkers were scientists as well as philosophers, and had a great deal to say on the relation between the two disciplines. These pragmatists influenced, and were influenced by, thinkers from both sides of the analytic - continental divide. In the next generation, figures such as Jane Addams, John Dewey and Alain Locke saw in pragmatism a way to use philosophy for educational and political uses, and rejected the elitism and intellectualism they saw infecting all kinds of philosophy. More recently, pragmatists such as Richard Rorty, Hilary Putnam, Elizabeth Anderson, Robert Talisse and Cheryl Misak, can be found on both sides of the divide.
William James saw pragmatism as a 'corridor' which allowed different traditions and disciplines to engage with each other. This conference asks how pragmatism might allow the analytic and the continental traditions of philosophy to engage in new and useful ways. Perhaps relating pragmatism to analytic and continental philosophy can provide new suggestions regarding the methodologies, styles, roles, and topics that we think should govern philosophy. Perhaps attention to the links which classical pragmatism has to both sides might further dissolve the divide. Perhaps, as some pragmatists have hoped, pragmatism sits at the end of the development of both continental and analytic philosophy. Or perhaps a rejection of pragmatism by both traditions might forge new links between them.
Typically, analytic and continental philosophies are differentiated according to origins, methodologies, styles, and concerns. Analytic philosophy emerged in the early 20th century with British thinkers such as Bertrand Russell and G. E. Moore. It was presented as a split from a broader philosophical tradition which included Kant and Hegel, and was labelled 'continental' with the inclusion of figures such as Husserl, Kierkegaard, and Heidegger.
Analytic philosophy is defined, according to Dummett, by the view that the goal of philosophy is 'the analysis of the structure of thought', and that 'the only proper method of analysing thought consists in the analysis of language'. The preferred methodology for this project is the systematic, precise, and technical analysis of language and concepts, often with an appeal to formal logic. Stylistically, analytic philosophy prefers technical and clear prose, which deal with small, highly specific areas. This suits the primary concerns of analytic philosophy, which are the often seen to be questions of logic, metaphysics, and epistemology, treated rigorously and removed from the concerns of everyday life. Philosophy tends to be seen as a science, dealing like other sciences with narrow questions and specific research projects. The relation between philosophy and the sciences, and the role of the sciences within philosophy, is an important concern for analytic philosophy.
Continental philosophy is more difficult to categorise, as it is a term created by analytic philosophers in order to classify all European philosophy which was not analytic. It contains many diverse traditions, such as phenomenology, existentialism, idealism, critical theory and postmodernism. A broader array of methodologies can be found in continental philosophy, from phenomenological analysis, to genealogical analysis, and critical engagement with cultural practices. Correspondingly, the styles which can be found in continental philosophy are often less clear than the rigorous analytic standards allow for. They tend to be more evocative, literary, and even performative than analytic philosophy, in part because continental philosophy's central areas of concern are not always best dealt with using scientific precision. Topics and goals in continental philosophy range from metaphysics and epistemology, to questions concerning the nature of human existence, and philosophical criticisms of contemporary culture. Continental philosophy is also concerned with its relation to science, but this is often (though not always) accompanied by a suspicion of scientific hegemony and an appeal to literature and art instead.
This story, and the corresponding divide, has come under increasing pressure in recent years. Some analytic philosophers have rediscovered the importance of Kant and Hegel, as well as other non-analytic thinkers. The subjects which analytic philosophy considers relevant or philosophically considerable has also been broadened. Conversations between the traditions have opened up, in part due to increased engagement with figures who transcend the divide (such as Wittgenstein). Nonetheless, there are still questions concerning the methodology, style, subject matter, and goals of philosophy on which typically analytic and continental philosophers disagree, as well as issues concerning philosophy's role in wider society, and its relation with other disciplines and sciences.
American Pragmatism is a philosophical tradition which emerged outside of Europe, and predates the division between analytic and continental philosophy. As such, it has elements which both sides can recognise. Charles Sanders Peirce pioneered quantification logic, a favourite of analytic philosophy, but also semiotic analysis, a favourite of the continentals. William James was concerned to bring the method of science to bear on philosophy, but did so in order to defend a phenomenological and humanistic approach which foregrounded the human importance of traditional philosophical concerns. Both thinkers were scientists as well as philosophers, and had a great deal to say on the relation between the two disciplines. These pragmatists influenced, and were influenced by, thinkers from both sides of the analytic - continental divide. In the next generation, figures such as Jane Addams, John Dewey and Alain Locke saw in pragmatism a way to use philosophy for educational and political uses, and rejected the elitism and intellectualism they saw infecting all kinds of philosophy. More recently, pragmatists such as Richard Rorty, Hilary Putnam, Elizabeth Anderson, Robert Talisse and Cheryl Misak, can be found on both sides of the divide.
William James saw pragmatism as a 'corridor' which allowed different traditions and disciplines to engage with each other. This conference asks how pragmatism might allow the analytic and the continental traditions of philosophy to engage in new and useful ways. Perhaps relating pragmatism to analytic and continental philosophy can provide new suggestions regarding the methodologies, styles, roles, and topics that we think should govern philosophy. Perhaps attention to the links which classical pragmatism has to both sides might further dissolve the divide. Perhaps, as some pragmatists have hoped, pragmatism sits at the end of the development of both continental and analytic philosophy. Or perhaps a rejection of pragmatism by both traditions might forge new links between them.
