

A person is silhouetted on a rocky ledge on the left, looking out through a dark cave opening. The view outside shows a rugged mountain range with rocky peaks and patches of snow under a blue sky with white clouds. The overall scene is dramatic and high-contrast.

# PRAGMATISM AND THE ANALYTIC - CONTINENTAL SPLIT

## ABSTRACTS

With thanks to: the Mind Association, Analysis Trust, Aristotelian Society, British Society for the History of Philosophy, Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy, and the White Rose College of Arts and Humanities.

*Pragmatism, Analytic Philosophy, and the Question  
of the Real*

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In her 2013 book *The American Pragmatists*, the renowned Peirce scholar Cheryl Misak sets out to show that, historically, pragmatism and analytic philosophy has not been opposed to each other in the way that it has been suggested by such figures as Richard Rorty and Louis Menand. Instead, Misak claims, pragmatism has “a strong and unbroken analytic lineage” since “the founders of pragmatism were pioneers of analytic philosophy”. As she herself admits, Misak has to divide the history of pragmatism up into two camps in order to make this story work. On the one hand, there are the ‘good’ “objective” or “realist” pragmatists such as Peirce and Chauncey Wright, who were interested in many of the same problems as some of the 20th century’s most prominent analytic philosophers. On the other hand, there are the ‘bad’ “subjective” or “idealist” pragmatists such as Dewey and James, who are largely responsible for Rorty’s idea that pragmatism and analytic philosophy are incompatible.

In this paper I want to focus on the way in which Misak’s attempt to build a bridge between pragmatism and analytic philosophy influences her reading of one of her “subjective” or “idealist” philosophers, namely Dewey. More specifically, I will discuss the way in which she uses the terms “realism” and “idealism” as well as “objective” and “subjective” to describe the difference between different forms of pragmatism. Despite the fact that she claims to be practicing an analytic form of philosophy that “has argumentative rigor, logic, and a respect for science and its methodology at its centre”, Misak does not provide an explicit definition of her fundamental categories (“realism”, “idealism”, “subjective”, “objective”), but just seems to take them for granted. At the same time, they also seem to make it difficult for her to understand many of Dewey’s ideas – including his crucial idea of inquiry as the transformation of a problematic situation – which she often describes as “bizarre”, “awkward” and “muddled” when she does not explicitly admit that she “cannot make sense of” them. In my paper I would like to suggest that Dewey was much more reflective about the use of such categories. In *Experience and Nature* he thus points out that it is impossible for someone like Misak to criticize his thinking “on account of [her] realism” since “the question at issue is what the real is”. So the big issue between Dewey’s classical pragmatism and Misak’s modern analytic form is “what the real is”, and from a Deweyan perspective, I would argue, it is in fact Misak’s philosophy that seems to be “subjective” and “idealist”. After documenting this claim I will end my paper by discussing whether the disagreement over “what the real is” and Misak’s concomitant inability to understand many of Dewey’s ideas point to an inherent opposition between Dewey’s pragmatism and analytic philosophy as she understands it. I tend to think it does not, even though the deep differences do seem to pose a serious challenge to fruitful interaction.

*Critical Commonsensism and Contemporary Analytic Metaphysics*

Graeme A. Forbes  
(Kent)

If you self-identify as a ‘pragmatist’ in contemporary analytic metaphysics, it is likely you will be regarded as a form of anti-realist. I will sketch a *realist* version of pragmatism inspired by the Critical Commonsensism of the later C.S. Peirce. This realism avoids the epistemic austerity of the Humean, and so need not eschew what Sider calls ‘hypothetical properties’. It also avoids commitment to a God’s Eye View of the world, on which realist metaphysics can wallow in the fruitless debates that pragmatism was founded to oppose. Thus it avoids making do with merely debunking explanations (as Cambridge Pragmatism does), but equally avoid committing to a realism which countenances to possibility of nightmarish Cartesian scepticism (which model-theoretical arguments show to be incoherent).

My Critical Commonsensism allows for a defence of substantial metaphysical theses, including realism about the external world; other minds; causation; the passage of time; and truth, through pragmatic transcendental arguments. Certain fundamental projects, such as inquiry, and agency, require presuppositions in order to make sense. Metaphysics, on my view, is the study of such presuppositions. While we cannot know whether our fundamental projects do make sense, but we must commit ourselves to them, and to their presuppositions, or give such projects up. Since giving such projects up is almost impossible, we have strong pragmatic grounds to commit to them, and their presuppositions.

I survey three of the main challenges for this methodology for metaphysics. These are: for any substantive metaphysical thesis, it is not genuinely a presupposition for some fundamental project. For any project purported to be fundamental, its fundamentality is merely apparent. For any fundamental project, it is only fundamental-for-us, and not fundamental *simpliciter*. I use these challenges to outline how metaphysics would proceed if we accepted this methodology.

*Regulative Commitments: An Attractive Alternative to  
Regulative Assumptions*

Nathan Haydon  
(Waterloo)

Peirce scholars have come to see Peirce's metaphysics as resting on an appeal to regulative assumptions. The expression comes, at least most notably in the context of Peirce's writings, from Hookway and Mizak (Hookway [2002] and Mizak [2004]). Recent developments can also be found in Howat [2013] and Atkin [2015]. Regulative assumptions, it is said, are assumptions that are made to continue to engage in a practice and for a practice to have a chance at being successful [Misak, 2013, p. 50-52]. The expression 'regulative assumptions' comes from Kant, and some Peirce scholars have likened regulative assumptions in Peirce to regulative assumptions in Kant. The connection is not inappropriate. Peirce acknowledges a Kantian influence, and his early discussions of regarding regulative assumptions seem to share features of indispensability arguments. Peirce would later, however, explicitly reject appeals to transcendental claims. He takes transcendental explanations to be poor and finds appeals to 'necessary' factors and 'presuppositions' or 'preconditions' of a practice to be vague and unhelpful. In the end Peirce does not give regulative assumptions any transcendental status. A practitioner cannot appeal to transcendental factors to defend regulative assumptions. If we move beyond the Kantian account, as I think we should, then the question becomes what sort of epistemic status a practitioner should nonetheless give to these regulative assumptions.

Misak suggests that the propositional attitude a practitioner adopts toward regulative assumptions always remains a mere hope. "[Peirce] is very clear," she writes, "that this a different matter from believing or asserting" [Misak, 2013, p. 65]. In this case an individual engaged in a practice can at best hope that these assumptions are true. Hookway recognizes a similar tension in Peirce's views [Hookway, 2002, Ch. 9]. Hookway resolves this tension by appealing to a distinction between practical, or living beliefs, and the theoretical beliefs that are the result of scientific inquiry. The practitioner on this account can defend regulative assumptions on practical grounds but not theoretical grounds.

I suggest an alternative to regulative assumptions. Regulative commitments, as I prefer to call them, are the commitments that characterize a practice and an individual engaged in it. In characterizing a practice, regulative commitments serve an important explanatory function and so are amenable scientific investigation. They are not so much assumptions that an individual makes, or has to be cognizant of, but are commitments that an individual acts in accord with when engaged in a practice.

This account of regulative commitments suggests that the views given by Misak and Hookway are incorrect. The debate is overblown. Regulative commitments, contra Misak, can go on to be confirmed, and regulative commitments can be confirmed in the same manner, contra Hookway, as beliefs that are the result of scientific inquiry. The solution lies in a proper understanding of Peirce's position. We should, in fact, expect such continuity of confirmation in Peirce. In this talk I motivate, develop, and defend this account of regulative commitments in Peirce.

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## *Apel's Pragmatic Transformation of Transcendental Philosophy*

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It is the intention of this paper to provide an account of Apel's use of Peircean resources in outlining what he calls a 'pragmatic' or 'semiotic' transformation of transcendental philosophy and opposing this to Gadamer's relativistic historicism. Drawing upon Peirce's semiotic distinction between (i) the object of a sign, (ii) the thought in which a sign is interpreted, and (iii) the sign itself, Apel distinguishes three philosophical 'paradigms', each of which corresponds roughly to a period in the history of philosophy. The first of these, 'ontological metaphysics', aspires to determine objects independently of the subjective and semiotic conditions of their representation, and has, according to Apel, been thoroughly discredited by the epistemological critique motivating its successor paradigm- 'the transcendental philosophy of consciousness'. According to Apel, however, by implicitly adopting a 'methodological solipsism', transcendental philosophy of this familiar Kantian idealist variety fails to acknowledge certain intersubjective and linguistic conditions in the absence of which thought would be without any object. Like Gadamer and other hermeneutic philosophers, Apel maintains that all understanding is necessarily conditioned by one's membership of a historical cultural community, and hence that Kant does not give due recognition to historically inherited factors in human knowledge. Unlike Gadamer, however, Apel follows Peirce in recognising a universally valid standard of truth in the ideal long-run consensus of opinion amongst members of the sign-using community. Nonetheless, Apel departs from Peirce by maintaining that specifically transcendental commitments follow from the obligation to hold ourselves accountable to a certain ideal normative standard, i.e. the long-run consensus of opinion towards which a community of sign-users sets its sights.

According to Apel's 'transcendental pragmatics'- his Peirce-inspired semiotic revision of Kantian transcendentalism- certain commitments are necessarily undertaken in the very act of argumentation and are, as such, 'non-circumventible' (*nicht hintergebar*). These 'transcendental pragmatic conditions' (so-called because of their status as a priori necessary presuppositions of argument *acts*) cannot be contested without 'performative self-contradiction', that is, without a contradiction between what one says and one's act of saying it. A performative self-contradiction is committed, for instance, by anyone who maintains that there are no universally valid truths, insofar as one intends by this utterance to assert something which is true under all conditions and without exception.

Amongst the transcendental pragmatic conditions of reasoning and argumentation, Apel includes the existence of other sign-users with whom one can jointly reason and the reality of publicly-accessible facts discoverable by collaborative research. Peirce denies, however, that any of the presuppositions of inquiry have a transcendental function, and confers upon them the more modest title of 'logical hopes'. This paper shall examine the significance of this disagreement between Apel and Peirce on this matter. It shall be argued that while Apel is mistaken in his transcendentalist reading of Peirce's pragmatism and semiotics, his own position is nonetheless illustrative of the opportunities for productive interaction which exist between various twentieth century movements in philosophy and of the potential which there remains for transcendental approaches to investigate the a priori grounds of human understanding.

## *Thinking Peirce's Phaneroscopy without Being*

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One of the main critiques of post-structuralism is 'Being' (l'être/ εἶναι). 'Being' and what comes before it, with it, or out of it (being(s)-entities, presence, subject, object, logic as calculus) constitutes a way of thinking. Specifically, a habituated way of interpreting what comes along the way with respect to what we want to do. Unquestioned, this habituated way of thinking has led to our forgetting that this way of interpreting is only just *one* way of understanding our 'world' and not *the* only way of understanding the world. Another way to interpret what comes along with respect to what we want to do focuses on the *effort* to do something and the *resistance* encountered. In this paper, I would like to follow these two concepts which appear on Peirce's *Phaneroscopy* and have not received due attention. In so doing, I would risk the hypothesis that Peirce's philosophy stands as an anticipated critique between classical metaphysics (sensible/intelligible entities – analytic philosophy) and classical phenomenology (the being of the phenomenon and the phenomenon of being – critical/continental philosophy).

To accomplish the articulation of such a hypothesis I shall focus on the concept of *phaneron*. The latter has predominately been explained through the schema of being (ontology) as '*what there is*' presupposing a concept of unity. What can be predicated to be through 'is' leads unavoidably to our equating the *phaneron* with the phenomenon. Resisting this interpretation, I will attempt a reading of *Phaneroscopy* according to which the schema 'is' cannot be interpreted as assimilating an existential import unless the utterer of the 'is' has been taken into account. What kind of being would there be (exist) "if I were to discourse the effects of chromatic decoration of a man congenitally blind?" (p. 75). What 'there is' as what 'exists' cannot take on a democratic implicature on how most people are (the average, normal, bipod, two eyes etc). The *phaneron* resists the logic of vision and the vision of logic of classical metaphysics – or any kind of sensualist presupposition to which Peirce was opposed. In this way, the *phaneron* can be discussed through the logos of Heraclitus or the will to power of Nietzsche as a choice of interpretation, a decision which has not been questioned – has not received a *shock* (Peirce) or *choc* (Nietzsche). Concomitantly, *Phaneroscopy* denying these classical philosophical (eidetic) categories, allows axiology to take precedence over ontology and epistemology. The *phaneron* is what exists based on how one is at the time of the predication (theorization) which is always already complicit with the end aimed. No single thing exists but qualities, multiplicities. If our aim is to universalize on what there is based on whoever can state what there is, then that would lead us to feeling (of) resistance and effort as brute facts – active and reactive forces. Such reading supplements Apel's critical realist reading of Peirce with the post-structuralist feminist critique of a patriarchal transcendental epistemic justification and hence allowing an authentic dialogue between the traditions.

*The Influence of Peirce in Contemporary Science – Philosophy – Theology*

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Although revolutions in the Thomas Kuhn (1922-1996) sense of “paradigm shift” are rare in physics, when they do occur, they radically alter our understanding of the physical universe. Physicists point to five major theories or revolutions that have dramatically altered our view of the universe and the human person’s place in it: The Heliocentric Theory, the Electromagnetic Field Theory, the Special and General Theories of Relativity, Quantum Theory, and the Big Bang Theory. Deterministic mechanism of modern science espoused in various forms by eminent scientists, like the physicist Thomas Krauss and the respected but nonetheless controversial evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins, use these theories to stake a claim—that we live in a world of pure chance. The suggestion that we live in a world of necessary regularities fosters a kind of extrinsicism akin to the age-old grace versus nature debate – a hard separation of the temporal order from the supernatural in which the temporal or natural world is completely untouched and has no basis in the supernatural. In its pure unadulterated form, the five major theories of physics pose an immense challenge to Christian understanding of the world and the human person’s place in it. Then there is the added challenge of developing a theological method that can withstand the scrutiny of deterministic mechanism of modern science. Thus, there is a need for a recalibration of Science-philosophy-theology dialogue in ways that addresses the important matters of creation and eschatology in light of new findings in physics.

I draw from the works of three thinkers: C.S. Peirce (1839-1914) who developed a first-order logic and a semiotic system, Bernard Lonergan (1904-1984) who developed a cross-disciplinary method of inquiry, and Wolfhart Pannenberg (1928-2014) who initiated science-theology dialogue. Due largely to the foundational work of Peirce, all three thinkers developed a robust phenomenology and made serious attempts to engage with modern science in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries respectively. Working independently of each other and out of their respective architectonic systems, they worked out a theory of world process that adequately addresses questions arising from neo-Darwinian science. More importantly, together the three thinkers laid the foundational work of science-philosophy-theology rapprochement by an appeal to critical realism—that there is an intelligibility in the universe and the intelligibility uncovered by physics can be understood in ways consistent with the Christian understanding of the universe and the God-Humanity-World relationship. A sub-set of my argument will be to identify resources for rethinking the God-Humanity-World relationship in ways consonant with the much-adulated revolutions in physics. Thus, I show that like physics, Christian theology can pinpoint revolutions that have dramatically shaped our knowledge of the cosmos and the human person’s place in it, particularly the revolution that Lonergan technically termed the Law of the Cross.

*Peirce as Contact Theorist: Realism, Radical Critique, and the Doctrine of Immediate Perception*

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Merleau-Ponty notoriously wrote: “to ask whether the world is real is not to understand what we are saying.” There are at least two ways to interpret this affirmation. We could regard it as an early expression of post-modern skepticism about the very idea of reality. Alternatively, we might take it as reflecting another quite self-conscious trait of contemporary philosophical thought: the desire to re-articulate human experience through a phenomenological investigation of its pre-conceptual ties to the world. These two interpretations — leading respectively to the denial and retrieval of the project of philosophical realism — express a pervasive tension within so-called “Continental” philosophy. It corresponds, on the “Analytic” side, to the tension between the outright denial and qualified acceptance of the project of “radical critique” — a critique that is critical of its own presuppositions and conditions as critique.

A crucial assumption is shared by the “deniers” on both sides of the Analytic-Continental Split (hereafter ACS): the conviction that a truly radical critique cannot help *undermining* the pretensions of common-sense realism; conversely, that the latter must start from basic data and principles which it is the task of all (critical) reflection to *represent*. In this paper I argue that Charles Peirce was one of the first modern philosophers to challenge this assumption. He did so, in particular, by articulating an alternative form of philosophical realism: one which is independent of the currently widespread (however unconfessed) commitment to conceiving the mind in representational and synchronic terms. To that extent he solved a problem which is, according to my hypothesis, relevant to explain the emergence and development of ACS.

As Dreyfus and Taylor have recently argued, abandoning representationalism needs not entail undermining robust common-sense realism. To the contrary, a proper understanding of the epistemological framework that continues to hold us captive (the “mediational” picture of knowledge) points us toward the necessity of retrieving a form of realism which is less based on the notion of representation than on the idea of a temporary extended “contact” between the subject and object of experience. Dreyfus considers Wittgenstein and Heidegger (the primary fathers of ACS), together with Merleau-Ponty, as the champions of this still little understood philosophical revolution. In what follows I will show how this story could be enriched by regarding Charles Peirce’s strenuous (any yet rarely mentioned) defense of the “doctrine of immediate perception,” and the broader philosophical outlook in which it is situated, as the first powerful expression of 20<sup>th</sup> century “contact theory.” First, I will show how Peirce’s position developed in relation to his critical engagement with Kant’s transcendental project, in particular his refutation of subjective idealism in the second edition of the first critique. Second, I will argue that Peirce’s pragmatist conception of experience (which combines a rejection of the “spectator” picture of knowledge with a defense of a critical form of common-sense) anticipates and in some respects clarifies Merleau-Ponty’s own attempt to retrieve realism through the notion of “operative intentionality.”

## *The Limitless Community and Scientific Inquiry*

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(Uniandes)

One goal in contemporary philosophy of science is to bridge the gap between analytical and continental concerns regarding scientific *inquiry*, through a new account in which inquiry is pluralistic, epistemically objective—a traditional concern in analytic philosophy—and socially or culturally informed—a traditional concern in continental philosophy. The pragmatist philosophy of C. S. Peirce and John Dewey, particularly their conceptions of the scientific community, serves as a fruitful approach to this current problem in the philosophy of science. However, there seems to be a tension within the pragmatist conception: Should we understand the scientific community as *one* limitless community or as *many* communities, each with its own methods, standards and goals? In this paper I defend that we should not view both notions of community as opposed, but as complementary, and that by doing so we can overcome this tension and give an account of inquiry that is pluralistic, objective and socially informed.

In the philosophy of Peirce, the community circumscribes inquiry and its results, due to the characteristics of the scientific method: Peirce thought that truth could only be understood from the point of view of the community, for there should be a certain permanence external to each individual that might affect us all and that might, in the long run, lead us to the same conclusions. Peirce advances a vision of one limitless community: every person who shares the scientific method, broadly defined, is part of it. This notion of community fails, however, in giving a precise description of the social dynamics of limited scientific groups that are part of scientific inquiry because it focuses, chiefly, on the logical requirements of objectivity.

Dewey, on the other hand, defends the idea that inquiry is only possible in a context that is both biological and cultural, and holds that, to constitute a community, it is necessary for its members to be aware of the connections among the activities of each, and that they use this awareness to aim towards mutual goals. Therefore, Dewey has a notion of community as limited, where it is fruitful to study the social constraints of inquiry. Nevertheless, if we are left only with the notion of many limited communities we run the risk of losing, on the one hand, shared standards that allow us to debate and come to common conclusions, and, on the other hand, the goal of objectivity in scientific inquiry, for there would be no method to prevent science from depending on community's biases.

In this paper, I argue that to achieve the purpose of giving an account of scientific inquiry that is epistemically objective, socially constrained, and truly pluralistic, we must adopt, first and foremost, the notion of the limitless community. However, we should be able to move from this interpretation to one of the many limited scientific groups to understand and study actual social dynamics, such as true cooperation inside and among groups in the general frame of a limitless community. This double view of community allows us to give an account of scientific inquiry that meets our three main requirements of objectivity, sociality and pluralism.

## *A Pragmatist Critique of Philosophical Progress*

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According to Richard Rorty's pragmatist stance, philosophy, traditionally conceived, constitutes a dominant discourse of theoretical inquiry that reduces concrete reality in universal and ahistorical entities. Despite any ostensible differences and proclamations of the opposite, philosophy should be understood as fundamentally identified with essentialist metaphysics, and the versions it (diachronically and synchronically) assumes as variations of this metaphysical stance.

Thus, modern philosophy is understood to appear in two variations. The first is that of Cartesian metaphysics, and can be conceived, in a somehow simplified way, in terms of a triple thesis involving a sharp distinction between mind and world, a relation of representation between the two, and the grounding of this relation in an ahistorical subject. The second variation is that of Hegelian metaphysics, and despite the fact that it constitutes a critique of the Cartesian viewpoint, it shares with the latter the same metaphysical structure. Put in an equally simplified way, subject and world are replaced by a series of successive discourses produced by history. The fact that history is governed by ahistorical reason indicates that the Hegelian viewpoint can be seen as the replacement of one set of metaphysical categories with another.

According to this approach, both branches of analytic and continental philosophy, however defined and under whatever form of inquiry they appear, suggesting either an ahistorical conception of subject as condition of possibility of human experience, or an ahistorical conception of reason as condition of understanding of historical reality, belong to the same metaphysical tradition. Thus, Rorty's pragmatist stance can be seen to overcome the analytic-continental split through the critique of both branches as metaphysical.

The present paper approaches this issue in a twofold way. First, I analyse Rorty's thought. I attempt to show the way in which it constitutes a historicist nominalist, contextualist, and particularist stance, and a critical discourse that can undermine and overcome philosophy traditionally conceived. Second, I explore the metaphilosophical consequences of this stance, and attempt to show in which way representative, contemporary, metaphilosophical approaches that argue for an (even minimal) idea of progress in philosophy are undermined as metaphysical. Specifically, I focus on Alasdair MacIntyre's idea of the possibility of rational choice between rival philosophical paradigms, and argue that his idea that incommensurability does not preclude comparability is underpinned by specific metaphysical realist commitments concerning meaning and reference. Rorty's idea of philosophy as either *conversation* or *Geistesgeschichte* provides the diagnosis and therapy of this metaphilosophical picture.

Henri Wagner  
(Bordeaux)

Clarence Irving Lewis is mostly known for his pragmatic conception of the *a priori*. This conception is often compared to Reichenbach's relativization of the *a priori* or to Schlick's conventionalization of the *a priori*. Each of these three philosophers rejects the fundamental Kantian idea of an *a priori* synthesis and emphasizes the coextensivity between the *a priori* and the analytic. In Lewis's words : "The *a priori* is not a material truth, delimiting or delineating the content of experience as such, but is definitive or analytic in its nature" (Lewis 1929, 231). Nonetheless, reading Lewis's pragmatic reconception of the *a priori* in such a way exposes to miss the point lying behind this apparently shared conception. As the preceding quotation makes it clear, Lewis argues against a crucial element of « the Kantian solution of the problem of philosophy » (Wittgenstein 1998, 13), namely against the notion of the limits of experience insasmuch as such limits would have to secure the transcendental deduction by which Kant tried to prove the objective validity of the categories (Lewis 1929, x-xi, 38 and 320). According to Lewis, the notion of limits of possible experience and the correlative distinction between phenomena and noumena are designed as a way out of the skeptical problem : "Can conceptual order, which is of the mind, be imposed upon a content of experience which is independent and not yet given? This is the problem of the *a priori*." (Lewis 1929, 195 ; see also 213 and 219). Kant seems unable to face the skeptical challenge for the reason that his solution is both impossible and superfluous (Lewis 1929, 214-226).

We would like to scrutinize these arguments for two reasons. First, they are integral to the Lewisian distinctive sort of pragmatism, namely the "conceptualistic pragmatism" (Lewis 1929, xi). The heart of this pragmatism is a reconception of the Kantian *a priori* from a pragmatic point of view. This reconception is possible only on the condition that alternative categorial systems are conceivable. Here appears the relevance of Lewis's criticism addressed to the notion of limits of possible experience. Second, the Lewisian alternative to the Kantian solution discloses various elements which prove to elucidate on what sense Goodman inherits Lewis's treatment of the problem of the world order.

In order to expose our reading, we would like to rely on N. Goodman's essay "Snowflakes and Wastebaskets" which, as a memorial paper for Lewis, constitutes a sympathetic and synoptic view of *Mind and the World Order*. Reading Lewis's masterpiece through Goodman's eyes will allow us to do two things : first, to show that Lewis's purpose in *Mind and the World Order* is parasitic on his dissolution of the world order problem; second, to argue that this dissolution is taken for granted by Goodman and his new riddle of induction.

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## *Why the Second Grade of Clearness Matters: Peirce's Analytic Realism*

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One of the central debates among analytic philosophers has been the so-called realism/anti-realism debate concerning *truth*. As represented in works by Dummett (1978), Devitt (1984), Wright (1992) and others, it may be characterized as a dispute over whether there could be “verification-transcendent” or experience-transcendent truths: true statements that we could never verify, or true statements which have no verification-conditions. A correspondence conception of truth is attached to the realist position, one on which the correspondence relation is also held as verification- or experience-transcendent.

In *Peirce's* terms, such experience-transcendent true statements would be about realities that are “incognizable”. And most scholars would be quick to observe that in early works, such as his 1871 review of Berkeley, Peirce explicitly rejects the notion of an incognizable reality (W2:240, W2:470). Thus, he seems to reject the notion of experience-transcendent truths and to fall on the anti-realist side of the debate. However, Peirce's account of truth is complex; and I argue that the notion of an incognizable reality is compatible with his *overall* account of truth.

On Peirce's rule for attaining the *third grade* of clearness in our conceptions, truth is identified with the “final opinion” upon which all inquiry would eventually converge. So, on this grade, truth is *not* experience-transcendent. However, many have remarked upon an apparent tension between his analysis of *reality* on the third grade of clearness and his analysis of reality on the *second grade* of clearness. On the third grade, reality is the object of the final opinion and therefore does *not* outstrip possible cognition. But on the second grade, reality is “that whose characters are independent of what anybody may think them to be”, which is at least formally compatible with the notion of an incognizable reality.

There are different ways of resolving this apparent tension. The one I defend here treats the second grade of clearness as meaningful—as Peirce himself does (e.g. CP 8.218)—although a concept on the second grade may have different (what Peirce calls) *immediate objects* than the concept has on the third grade. Because an incognizable reality is a formal possibility on the second grade, it can be an immediate object on that grade. And while the notion of an incognizable reality lacks any perceptual or pragmatic content or *interpretants*, it has linguistic and inferential habits as its interpretants. Peirce's philosophy thereby preserves intuitions that reality may outstrip possible cognition. I call this Peirce's analytic realism.

Further, the second grade concept of *truth*, which Peirce holds is the *correspondence concept* (W3:282) preserves other intuitions about truth common among analytic philosophers. It allows us to explain how propositions about fictional objects (e.g. “Sherlock Holmes lives at 221b Baker Street”) can be true. Though they cannot be on the third grade concept of truth, they can be true in that *they correspond to their immediate objects* (as opposed to their *dynamical objects*). Lastly, I argue that this analysis about truths concerning fictional objects extends to truths in pure mathematics.